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ABSTRACT
The availability of public computing resources in the cloud has rev-
olutionized data analysis, but requesting cloud resources often in-
volves complex decisions for consumers. Under the current pric-
ing mechanisms, cloud service providers offer several service op-
tions and charge consumers based on the resources they use. Be-
fore they can decide which cloud resources to request, consumers
have to estimate the completion time and cost of their computa-
tional tasks for different service options and possibly for different
service providers. This estimation is challenging even for expert
cloud users.
We propose a new market-based framework for pricing compu-
tational tasks in the cloud. Our framework introduces an agent be-
tween consumers and cloud providers. The agent takes data and
computational tasks from users, estimates time and cost for evalu-
ating the tasks, and returns to consumers contracts that specify the
price and completion time. Our framework can be applied directly
to existing cloud markets without altering the way cloud providers
offer and price services. In addition, it simplifies cloud use for con-
sumers by allowing them to compare contracts, rather than choose
resources directly. We present design, analytical, and algorithmic
contributions focusing on pricing computation contracts, analyz-
ing their properties, and optimizing them in complex workflows.
We conduct an experimental evaluation of our market framework
over a real-world cloud service and demonstrate empirically that
our market ensures three key properties: (a) that consumers benefit
from using the market due to competitiveness among agents, (b)
that agents have an incentive to price contracts fairly, and (c) that
inaccuracies in estimates do not pose a significant risk to agents’
profits. Finally, we present a fine-grained pricing mechanism for
complex workflows and show that it can increase agent profits by
more than an order of magnitude in some cases.
1. INTRODUCTION
The availability of public computing resources in the cloud has
revolutionized data analysis. Users no longer need to purchase
and maintain dedicated hardware to perform large-scale comput-
ing tasks. Instead, they can execute their tasks in the cloud with
the appealing opportunity to pay for just what they need. They can
choose virtual machines with a wide variety of computational ca-
pabilities, they can easily form large clusters of virtual machines
to parallelize their tasks, and they can use software that is already
installed and configured.
Yet, taking advantage of this newly-available computing infras-
tructure often requires significant expertise. The common pricing
mechanism of the public cloud requires that users think about low-
level resources (e.g. memory, number of cores, CPU speed, IO
rates) and how those resources will translate into efficiency of the
user’s task. Ultimately, users with a well-defined computational
task in mind care most about two key factors: the task’s comple-
tion time and its financial cost. Unfortunately, many users lack
the sophistication to navigate the complex options available in the
cloud and to choose a configuration1 that meets their preferences.
As a simple example, imagine users who need to execute a work-
load of relational queries using the Amazon Relational Database
Service (RDS). They need to select a machine type from a list of
more than 20 possible options, including “db.m3.xlarge” (4 virtual
CPUs, 15GB of memory, costing $0.370 per hour) and “db.r3.xlarge”
(4 virtual CPUs, 30.5GB of memory, costing $0.475 per hour). The
query workload may run more quickly using db.r3.xlarge, because
it has more memory, however the hourly rate of db.r3.xlarge is also
more expensive, which may result in higher overall cost. Which
machine type should the users choose if they are interested in the
cheapest execution? Which machine type should they choose if
they are interested in the cheapest execution completing within 10
minutes? Typical users do not have enough information to make
this choice, as they are often not familiar with configuration pa-
rameters or cost models.
The reality of users’ choices is even more complex since they
may choose one of five data management systems through RDS,
or other query engines using EC2, including parallel processing
engines, and different configuration options for each. They might
also be tempted to compare multiple service providers, in which
case they would have to deal with different pricing mechanisms in
addition to different configuration options. Amazon RDS charges
based on the capacity and number of computational nodes per hour;
Google BigQuery charges based on the size of data processed; Mi-
crosoft Azure SQL Database charges based on the capacities of
service tiers like database size limit and transaction rate.
As a result of this complexity, many users of public cloud re-
sources make naïve, suboptimal choices that result in overpayment,
and/or performance that is contrary to their preferences (e.g., it ex-
ceeds their desired deadline or exceeds their budget). Thus, instead
of paying only for what they need, the reality is that they pay for
what they do not need and, even worse, they pay more than they
have to for it.
A market for database computations.
To ease the burden on users we propose a new market-based
framework for pricing computational tasks in the cloud. Our frame-
work introduces an entity called an agent, who acts as a broker be-
tween consumers and cloud service providers. The agent accepts
1A configuration here means a set of system resources and its set-
tings, provided by the cloud provider. It includes the number of
virtual instances of a cluster, the buffer size of a cloud database,
and so on.
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data and computational tasks from users, estimates the time and
cost for evaluating the tasks, and returns to consumers contracts
that specify the price and completion time for each task.
Our market can operate in conjunction with existing cloud mar-
kets, as it does not alter the way cloud providers offer and price
services. It simplifies cloud use for consumers by allowing them to
compare contracts, rather than choose resources directly. The mar-
ket also allows users to extract more value from public cloud re-
sources, achieving cheaper and faster query processing than naive
configurations. At the same time, a portion of the value an agent
helps extract from the cloud will be earned by the agent as profit.
Agents are conceptually distinct from cloud service providers in
the sense that they have their intelligent models to estimate time and
cost given consumers queries. In other words, agents take the risk
of estimation, while service providers simply charge based on re-
source consumption, which guarantees profit. In practice, an agent
could be a service provider (who provides estimation as a service
in addition to cloud resources), a piece of software sold to con-
sumers, or a separate third party who provides service across mul-
tiple providers.
Scope. Our goal in this paper is not to develop a new technical ap-
proach for estimating completion time or deriving an optimal con-
figuration for a cloud-based computation. Prior work has consid-
ered these challenges, but, in our view, has not provided a suitable
solution to the complexity of cloud provisioning. The reason is
that estimation, even for relatively well-defined tasks like relational
workloads, is difficult. Proposed methods require complicated pro-
filing tasks to generate models and specialize to one type of work-
load (e.g., Relational database [33] or MapReduce [26]). In addi-
tion, there is inherent uncertainty in prediction, caused by multi-
tenancy common in the cloud [66, 55, 17, 62, 34]. Lastly, users’
preferences are complex, involving both completion time [53] and
cost [51, 82, 35, 84, 38], which have been considered as separate
goals [27, 42, 44], but have not been successfully integrated.
Our market-based framework incentivizes expert agents to em-
ploy combinations of existing estimation techniques to provide this
functionality as a service to non-expert consumers. Users can ex-
press preferences in terms of their utility, which includes both time
and cost considerations. Uncertainty in prediction becomes a risk
managed by agents, and included in the price of contracts, rather
than a problem for users. Ultimately our work complements re-
search into better cost estimation in the cloud [75, 12, 27]. In fact,
our market will function more effectively as such research advances
and agents can exploit new techniques for better estimation.
Our work makes several contributions:
• We define a novel market for database computations, including
flexible contracts reflecting user preferences.
• We formalize the agent’s task of pricing contracts and propose
an efficient algorithm for optimizing contracts.
• We perform extensive evaluation on Amazon’s public cloud,
using benchmark queries and real-world scientific workflows.
We show that our market is practical and effective, and satisfies
key properties ensuring that both consumers and agents benefit
from the market.
The paper is organized as follows. We present an overview of the
market and main actors in Section 2. We formally define contracts
and optimal pricing of contracts in Section 3 and 4. We extend our
framework to support fine-grained pricing to further optimize con-
tracts in Section 5. In Section 6, we introduce several alternatives.
In Section 7, we present a thorough evaluation of our proposed mar-
ket, and demonstrate that it guarantees several important properties.
Consumer	   Agent	   Cloud	  Provider	  
1.Proposal 
2.Contract 
3.Permission 
6.Result Link 
4.Job 
5.Result Link 
0.Configurations 
Figure 1: An overview of interactions of the main participants in
the computation market: the consumer, the agent, and the cloud
provider.
Finally, we discuss related work and extension and summarize our
contributions in Sections 8, 9 and 10, respectively.
2. COMPUTATION MARKET OVERVIEW
In this section, we discuss the high-level architectural compo-
nents of our computation market: three types of participants and
their interactions through computation contracts. Our computation
market exhibits several desirable properties, which we mention in
Section 2.3.
2.1 Market participants
Our goal is to model the interactions that occur in a computation
market, and design the roles and framework in a way that ensures
that the market functions effectively. Our computation market in-
volves three types of participants:
Cloud provider. Cloud providers are public entities that offer com-
putational resources as a service, on a pay-as-you-go basis.
These resources are often presented as virtual machine types
and providers charge fees based on the capabilities of the vir-
tual machines and the duration of their use. Our framework
does not enforce any assumptions on the types, quantity, or
quality of resources that a cloud provider offers.
Consumer. A consumer is a participant in our computational mar-
ket who needs to complete a computational task over a dataset
D. We assume the computational task is a set of queries or
MapReduce jobs2, denoted as Q = {Q1,Q2, ...,Qn}. We as-
sume that the consumer does not own the computational re-
sources needed to complete Q, and thus needs to use cloud
resources. However, the consumer may not have the exper-
tise to determine which cloud provider to use, which resources
to lease, or how to configure them. In our framework, the
consumer wishes to retrieve the task results Q(D) = {Q1(D),
Q2(D), ...,Qn(D)} within a specified timeframe, and pay for
these results directly. Therefore, the consumer’s goal is to com-
plete the task efficiently and for low cost. Different consumers
have different time and cost preferences. They will describe
these preferences precisely using a utility function, as described
later in Section 3.1.
Agent. Consumers’ needs are task-centric (time and price to com-
plete a given task), whereas cloud providers’ abilities are resource-
centric (time and price for a type of resource). Due to this dis-
parity, consumers and providers do not interact directly in our
framework. Rather, a semantically separate entity, the agent, is
tasked with handling the interactions between consumers and
2For simplicity of terminology we use “query” to refer to either a
query or MapReduce job.
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cloud providers. The agent receives a task request from a con-
sumer and, in response, calculates a price to complete the task,
providing the consumer with a formal contract. We review con-
tracts in Section 2.2, and describe them in detail in Section 3.
The agent executes accepted contracts using public cloud re-
sources, and earns a profit whenever the contract price is greater
than the actual cost of executing the task. The agent’s goals
are to attract business by pricing contracts competitively and to
earn a profit with each transaction. One of the main challenges
for the agent is to assign accurate prices to consumer requests,
which requires knowledge of cloud resources, their capabilities
and costs, and expertise in tuning and query prediction.
Figure 1 illustrates the interactions among the three market par-
ticipants. In step 0, the agent collects details on available configu-
rations from the cloud provider to derive later price quotes on con-
sumers’ requests. This step may only need to be initiated once, and
reused afterwards. In steps 1 through 3, the agent receives a pro-
posal including Q and statistics about dataset D, denoted sD, which
are sufficient for pricing. For example, sD can be the number of in-
put records in each table [5], histograms on key columns or sets of
columns [73, 72, 74], a small sample of data [26], and other stan-
dard statistics relevant to the task. The agent reasons about possible
configurations and estimates the completion time and financial cost
of the queries, returning a priced contract to the consumer. If the
consumer accepts the contract, in steps 4 through 6, the agent ex-
ecutes a job in the cloud according to the contract, computes the
result, and returns a link to the consumer. The link can be, for ex-
ample, an URL pointing to Amazon S3 or any other cloud storage
service. Finally the agent receives payment based on the accepted
contract and the actual completion time. We will see in Section 3.2
that contracts can involve complex prices that depend on the actual
completion time.
2.2 Contracts
The contract is the core component of our framework, describ-
ing the terms of a computational task the agents will perform and
the price they will receive upon completion of the task. The design
of our market framework is intended to cope with the inevitable
uncertainty of completion time. Therefore, our contracts support
variable pricing based on the actual completion time when the an-
swer is delivered.
We also formally model the time/cost preferences of the con-
sumer using a utility function that we assume is shared with the
agent. The main technical challenge for the agent is to price a con-
tract of interest to a consumer. Pricing relies on the agent’s model
of expected completion time for the task as well as the consumer’s
utility. From the consumers’ side, they may receive and compare
contracts from multiple agents in order to choose the one that max-
imizes their utility.
In this paper, we consider contracts and computational tasks that
only involve analytic workloads. These analytic workloads are dif-
ferent from long-running services in the sense that their evaluation
takes limited amount of time, even though this time can be several
hours or days. Given this focus, we can assume that cloud resources
do not change during the execution of task. This means, for exam-
ple, that the capacity of virtual machines and their rate remain the
same during the execution of a contract. We discuss relaxing these
factors in Section 9.
2.3 Properties and assumptions
Our framework is designed to support three important properties:
competitiveness, fairness, and resilience. Competitiveness guaran-
tees that agents have an incentive to reduce runtime and/or cost for
consumers. Fairness guarantees that agents have an incentive to
present accurate estimates to consumers, and that they do not bene-
fit by lying about expected completion times. Resilience means that
an agent can profit in the marketplace even when their estimates of
completion time are imprecise and possibly erroneous. We demon-
strate empirically in Section 7 that our framework satisfies these
crucial properties.
Our framework assumes honest participants; we defer the study
of malicious consumers and agents to future work. Accepting an
agent’s contract means the consumer’s data will be shared with
the agent for evaluation of their task, however requesting contract
prices from a set of agents reveals only the consumer’s statistics
and task description.
Monopoly is not possible in this framework, and collusion among
agents is unlikely.3 First, an agent cannot constitute a monopoly,
since consumers may always choose to use a cloud service provider
directly. A service provider cannot constitute a monopoly either,
as any agent with a valid estimation model can enter the market.
Second, collusion becomes unlikely as the number of agents in the
market increases. Any agent who does not collude with others can
offer a lower price and draw consumers, making any collusion un-
stable.
3. THE CONSUMER’S POINT-OF-VIEW
In this section, we describe the consumer’s interactions with the
market. A transaction begins with a consumer who submits a re-
quest. This request reflects their utility, which is a precise descrip-
tion of their preferences. Later, given multiple priced contracts,
the consumers can formally evaluate them according to the likely
utility they will offer.
3.1 Consumer utility
One of our goals is to avoid simplistic definitions of contracts
in which a task is carried out by a deadline for a single price. For
one, many consumers have preferences far more complex than in-
dividual deadlines: they can tolerate a range of completion times,
assuming they are priced appropriately. In addition, we want agents
to compete to offer contracts that best meet the preferences of con-
sumers.
A consumer’s preferences are somewhat complex because they
involve tradeoffs between both completion time and price. We
adopt the standard economic notion of consumer utility [64] and
model it explicitly in our framework. A utility function precisely
describes a consumer’s preferences by associating a utility value
with every (time, price) pair. A utility function can encode, e.g.,
the fact that the consumer is indifferent to receiving their query an-
swer in 10 minutes at a cost of $2.30 or 20 minutes at a cost of
$1.90 (when these two cases have equal utility values) or that re-
ceiving an answer in 30 minutes at a cost of $0.75 is preferable to
both of the above (when it has strictly greater utility).
DEFINITION 3.1 (UTILITY). Utility U(t,pi) is a real-valued
function of time and price, which measures consumer satisfaction
when a task is evaluated in time t with price pi .
Larger values for U(t,pi) mean greater utility and a preferred
setting of t and pi . For a fixed completion time t0, a consumer
always prefers a lower price, so U(t0,pi) increases as pi decreases.
Similarly, for a fixed price, pi0, a consumer always prefers a shorter
completion time, so U(t,pi0) increases with decreasing t.
3In fact, the agents and the existing cloud service providers natu-
rally form a monopolistic competition [64, 43].
3
Time t (min)
0
5
10
15
20 Pr
ic
e 
pi 
(c
en
t)
20
15
10
5
0
Ut
il
it
y
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Figure 2: Utility function for Example 3.3 when t < 20.
To simplify the representation of a consumer’s utility, we will re-
strict our attention to utility functions that are piecewise linear. That
is, we assume the range of completion times [0,∞) is divided into
a fixed set of intervals, and that utility on each interval is defined
by a linear function of t and pi . This means that for each interval,
the consumer has a (potentially different) rate at which she/he is
willing to trade more time for lower price, and vice versa.
DEFINITION 3.2 (UTILITY – PIECEWISE). A piece-wise util-
ity function consists of a list of target times τ0, . . . ,τn, where 0 =
τ0 < τ1 < · · ·< τn−1 < τn =∞, and linear functions u1(pi, t), . . . ,un(pi, t).
The utility is ui(pi, t) for t ∈ [τi−1,τi).
Such utility functions can express conventional deadlines, but also
much more subtle preferences concerning the completion time and
price of a computation.
EXAMPLE 3.3. Consumer Carol has two target completion times
for her computation: 10 minutes and 20 minutes. Results returned
in less than 10 minutes are welcome, but she doesn’t wish to pay
more to speed up the task. When results are returned between 10
minutes and 20 minutes, every minute saved is worth 1 cent to her.
She does not want result returned after 20 minutes. Her piecewise
utility function is:
U(t,pi) =

u1(t,pi) =−pi (t < 10)
u2(t,pi) =− t−pi+10 (10≤ t < 20)
u3(t,pi) =−50 (t ≥ 20)
Figure 2 depicts U(t,pi) when t < 20.
In practice, users can construct the utility function by defining
several critical points on a graphical user interface, or answering a
few simple pair-wise preference questions.
3.2 Consumer contract proposal
The process of agreeing on a contract starts with the consumer
advertising to agents the basic terms of a contract: the task Q, the
statistics of the database sD, and their piecewise utility function U .
The terms of the contract are structured around the target times
in the utility function. Agents use the utility function to choose a
suitable configuration and pricing to match the preferences of the
consumer. A complete, priced contract is returned to the consumer,
which is defined as follows:
DEFINITION 3.4 (CONTRACT). A contract is a six-tuple C =
(Q,sD,T ,P, Tˆ ,Π), where Q is a task, sD consists of statistics about
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Figure 3: (a) Price function for Example 3.5. (b) Comparison of
two contracts.
the input data, T = (τ0,τ1, . . . ,τn) is an ordered list of target com-
pletion times, P = (p1, . . . , pn) is an ordered list of probabilities,
∑i pi = 1, Tˆ = (tˆ1, . . . , tˆn) is an ordered list of expected completion
times, and Π = (pi1(t), . . . ,pin(t)) is a list of price functions where
pii is defined on [τi−1,τi).
When a consumer and agent agree on a contract C , it means that
the agent has promised to deliver the answer to task Q on D after
time t ∈ [0,∞), where the likelihood that t falls in interval [τi−1,τi)
is pi. Accordingly, if the answer is delivered in the time interval
[τi−1,τi) the consumer agrees to pay the specified price, pii(t). Tˆ is
used for computing expected utility as we will see in Section 3.3.
The data statistics sD are given to the agent by the consumer; the
agent includes them in the contract because the pricing calculation
relies on these statistics.
The contract is an agreement to run the task once. The prob-
abilities provided by the agent are a claim that if the task were
run many times, a fraction of roughly pi of the time, the comple-
tion time would be in the interval [τi−1,τi). Without this informa-
tion, the consumer has no way to effectively evaluate the alternative
completion times that could occur in a contract. For example, all
alternatives but one could be very unlikely and this would change
the meaning of the contract. We will see in Section 4 how the agent
generates these probabilities.
EXAMPLE 3.5. An example contract based on the utility func-
tion of Example 3.3 is defined by T = (0,10,20,∞), probabilities
P= (0.2,0.5,0.3), expectations Tˆ = (9,15,21), and prices Π (also
illustrated in Figure 3a) defined as:
Π(t) =

pi1(t) =2 (t < 10)
pi2(t) =3−0.1t (10≤ t < 20)
pi3(t) =1 (t ≥ 20)
3.3 Consumer’s contract evaluation
In response to a proposed contract, a consumer hopes to receive
a number of priced versions of the contract from agents. Each con-
tract may offer the consumer a different range of utility values over
the probability-weighted completion times. The consumer’s goal
is to maximize their utility, so to choose between contracts, the
consumer should compute the expected utility of each contract and
choose the one with greatest expected utility. All contracts based
on 1 utility request should share the same target completion times.
DEFINITION 3.6 (EXPECTED UTILITY OF A CONTRACT). The
expected utility of a contract C = (Q,sD,T ,P, Tˆ ,Π) with respect
to utility function U(t,pi) is
n
∑
i=1
piui(tˆi,pii(tˆi))
when ui(t,pi) and pii(t) are linear functions.
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EXAMPLE 3.7. Suppose the consumer uses the utility function
in Example 3.3, and two agents return two contracts C1 and C2.
Further assume both agents return the same price function Π in
Example 3.5, and the expected time Tˆ are also the same. Only
the probabilities P differ as illustrated in Figure 3b. The con-
sumer computes the expected utility according to Definition 3.6 and
chooses C2 as it has greater utility.
4. THE AGENT’S POINT-OF-VIEW
We now explain the agent’s interactions in the market. The agent’s
main challenge is to assign prices to a contract, coping with the
uncertainty of completion time, while taking into account the con-
sumer’s utility and the market demand. We formalize two variants
of pricing (risk-aware and risk-agnostic) and formulate both as op-
timization problems.
4.1 Pricing preliminaries
Upon receipt of the terms of a contract and the utility function
of a consumer, the agent must complete the contract by computing
prices for each interval and assigning probabilities to each interval.
For each configuration, we assume the financial cost C borne
by the agent is a function of t: C(t) = αC · t, where αC is the unit
rate of the configuration, and can be different across configurations.
Thus, the pricing of a contract depends critically on the estimate of
the completion time for Q. Since estimates of completion time are
uncertain, we model completion time T as a probability distribution
over [0,∞) with probability density function fT (t). The true fT (t)
is unlikely to be known and, in practice, must be estimated by the
agent with respect to a selected configuration. Based on fT (t) and
C(t), the agent proposes a price function pi(t), which means the
consumer should pay pi(t) when the completion time is t.
The agent has three goals when pricing a contract: (i) to maintain
profitability, (ii) to offer the consumer appealing utility, and (iii) to
compete with the offerings of other agents. We discuss each of
these goals below.
(i) Profitability.
Naturally the agents would like to price the contract higher than
their cost of execution so that they can earn a profit. Profit is uncer-
tain for an agent because it is difficult to predict completion time
in the cloud. We say a contract is profitable in expectation if its ex-
pected profit, with respect to the distribution fT (t), is greater than
zero.
E[profit] =
n
∑
i=1
pi (pii(tˆi)−C(tˆi)) (4.1)
We call a contract profitable (for the agent) as long as it is profitable
in expectation. The agents should always price contracts so that
they are profitable, but it is possible that a particular contract ends
up being unprofitable.
DEFINITION 4.1 (PROFITABLE CONTRACT). A profitable con-
tract is a contract with E[profit]> 0.
(ii) Prioritizing consumer utility.
Since the agents knows the consumer’s utility function U(t,pi)
they can (and should) take it into account when choosing a con-
figuration and pricing. To the extent that the agents can match the
consumer’s utility, their pricing of the contract will be more appeal-
ing to the consumer. The agents can evaluate the expected utility
E[U ] over the distribution of time T based on their estimates and
price function pi(t):
E[U ] =
n
∑
i=1
piui(tˆi,pii(tˆi)) (4.2)
Profitability for the agent and utility for the consumer are con-
flicting objectives: a contract that offers greater profit to the agent
will offer lower utility to the consumer. We will see that the agent
will attempt to maximize the consumer’s utility, subject to con-
straints on their profitability.
(iii) Market competitiveness and demand.
In all markets, including ours, market forces and competition
prevent agents from raising prices without bound. In economics,
a market demand function describes how these forces impact the
pricing of goods [64].
When the agents decrease the price of a contract, the expected
profit of the contract is reduced but they increase the utility of the
contract to consumers. In a marketplace, when utility for the con-
sumer increases, a greater number of consumers will accept the
contract. Thus, the agents must balance the profit made from an
individual contract with the overall profit they make from selling
more contracts. To model this, we must make an assumption about
the relationship between utility and the number of contracts that
will be accepted by consumers in the market. This relationship is
represented by the demand function which is defined as a function
of utility. A linear demand curve is common in practice [64], so
we focus on demand functions of the form M(U) = a+ bU . Our
framework can support demand functions of different forms, but
we do not discuss these in detail.
In a real market, agents would learn about demand through re-
peated interactions with consumers. An agent’s demand function
could depend on, for example, customer loyalty, the best contracts
competitors can offer, and other factors. These factors are beyond
our scope. In order to simulate the functioning of a realistic market,
we must assume a demand function and, for simplicity, we assume
the demand functions of all agents are the same in the rest of this
paper.
4.2 Contract pricing
We start from the simplest case in which the consumer has a task
Q and a single configuration φ . So the cost function C(t) and the
pdf of the distribution of completion time fT (t) are fixed. The agent
needs to define the price function pi(t) to present a competitive con-
tract to the consumer. Let the overall profit beP , which equals the
unit profit profit multiplied by the sales M(U). Notice that profit
is the profit of a single contract whileP is the overall profit of all
contracts that the agent returns to all consumers in the market. The
agent wants to find the price function that leads to the greatest total
profit while satisfying the profitability constraint. This results in
the following optimization problem:
PROBLEM 4.2 (CONTRACT PRICING). Given a contractC =
(Q,sD,T ,P, Tˆ ,Π), utility function U, and demand function M, the
optimal price for C is:
maximize : P = E[profit] ·E[M(U)]
subject to : E[profit]> 0
Let Ii be the interval (ti, ti+1), and recall that pi is the probability
that the completion time falls in Ii:
pi =
∫ ti+1
t=ti
fT (t)dt (4.3)
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Let Ti be a random variable of completion time in interval Ii. It is a
truncated distribution with probability density function fT (t|t ∈ Ii).
Let Ci be a random variable of cost in interval Ii. Ci = C(Ti). So
expectation tˆi and expectation ci is:
tˆi = E[Ti] =
∫
t∈Ii
t fT (t|t ∈ Ii)dt (4.4)
ci = E[Ci] =
∫
t∈Ii
C(t) fT (t|t ∈ Ii)dt (4.5)
Therefore the expected unit profit and expected demand are:
E[profit] =
|I|
∑
i=1
(pii− ci)pi (4.6)
E[M(U)] =
|I|
∑
i=1
M (U(tˆi,pii)) pi (4.7)
Linear case.
When U and M are linear functions, this problem becomes a con-
vex quadratic programming problem. It has an analytical solution.
More details can be found in the appendix. Here we describe the
conclusion only, under the following assumptions:
• The consumer specifies a linear utility function U(t,pi)=−αU ·
t−βU ·pi , which means they are always willing to pay αU units
of cost to save βU units of time.
• The demand function is linear: M(U) = γM + λM ·U . Thus,
when U increased by 1/λM , 1 more contract would be ac-
cepted. Since U(t,pi) is linear, the demand function can be
written as M(U) = γM−αMt−βMpi .
Applying Equations 4.6 and 4.7 to Problem 4.2, we compute the
overall profitP . P is maximized when
piT p =

γM−αM tˆT p+βMcT p
2βM
, γM−αM tˆT p−βMcT p≥ 0
cT p+ ε, otherwise
where ε is a small positive value, and 4 vectors pi = [pi1,pi2, ...]T ,
p = [p1, p2, ...]T , tˆ = [tˆ1, tˆ2, ...]T and c = [c1,c2, ...]T .
Furthermore, when γM−αM tˆT p−βMcT p≥ 0,
P =
(γM−αM tˆT p−βMcT p)2
4βM
(4.8)
Selecting a configuration.
An agent typically has many available configurations for evalu-
ating Q. We denote the set of configurations by Φ = {φ1,φ2, ...}.
Every configuration φ j has its own cost function C j(t) = αC j · t,
where αC j is the unit rate for φ j .
The agent will select the configuration that results in the most
profit. The distribution of time T and its corresponding pi, tˆi, and ci
then become variables in Problem 4.2. A naïve agent can select and
enumerate a small Φ to find the best possible solution. A smarter
agent will use an analytic model to solve the problem [74, 27].
4.3 Risk-aware pricing
Pricing contracts involves some risk for the agents: if their es-
timated distributions of time and cost are different from the actual
ones, they can lose profit or even suffer losses. Next, we formally
define risk based on loss and add it as part of the objective.
DEFINITION 4.3 (LOSS). Let the actual distribution of com-
pletion time be T ∗ and the optimal price function be pi∗. When the
agent generates a contract with price function pi , the loss of rev-
enue L is: LT ∗(pi) =P(pi∗,T ∗)−P(pi,T ∗) =P(pi∗, p∗, t∗,c∗)−
P(pi, p∗, t∗,c∗), where p∗ is the actual probabilities, t∗ is the ac-
tual expected completion times, and c∗ is the actual costs.
There is always inherent uncertainty in the prediction of the dis-
tributions of completion of time and cost, so it is generally not pos-
sible for the agents to achieve the theoretically optimal profits based
on the actual distributions. However, they can plan for this risk, and
assess how much such risk they are willing to assume. We proceed
to define risk as the worst-case possible loss that an agent can suf-
fer.
DEFINITION 4.4 (RISK). The risk of the agent is a function
of price pi , and is defined as the maximum loss over possible distri-
butions of completion time: R(pi) = maxT ∗ LT ∗(pi).
We incorporate risk into the agent’s optimization problem by adding
it to the objective function:
maximize :P(pi, p, t,c)−λR(pi)
subject to : E[pro f it]> 0
(4.9)
The parameter λ in the objective is a parameter of risk that the
agent is willing to assume. Larger values of λ reduce the worst-
case losses (conservative agent), while smaller values of λ increase
the assumed risk (aggressive agent). The agent can estimate the risk
R(pi) by solving the following optimization problem, with variables
pi∗, p∗, t∗, and c∗:
maximize : LT ∗(pi) =P(pi∗, p∗, t∗,c∗)−P(pi, p∗, t∗,c∗)
subject to : E[pro f it∗] =∑(pi∗i − c∗i )p∗i > 0
LBoundt ≤ t∗i − tˆi ≤UBoundt
LBoundc ≤ c∗i − ci ≤UBoundc
0≤ p∗i ≤ 1
∑ p∗i = 1
where LBound and UBound are empirical values set by the agent.
For instance, an agent’s analytic model reports estimated tˆ1 = 1
min. However, the agent has executed 10 contracts and the actual
mean of the time is t1 = 1.1 min. The agent can set LBoundt = 0
and UBoundt = 0.1.
5. FINE-GRAINED CONTRACT PRICING
Our treatment of pricing in Section 4 assumes that agents se-
lect a single configuration for the execution of a consumer con-
tract. However, computational tasks often contain well-separated,
distinct subtasks (e.g., operators in a query plan or components in
a workflow). These subtasks may have vastly different resource
needs. For example, Juve et al. [32] profile multiple scientific
workflow systems including Montage [30] and SIPHT [40] and find
that their components have dramatically different I/O, memory and
computational requirements.
We now extend our pricing framework to support fine-grained
pricing, which allows agents to optimally assign separate configu-
rations to each subtask of a computational task. It provides more
candidate contracts without changing the pricing Problem 4.2. Fine-
grained pricing has two benefits. First, by assigning a configura-
tion for each subtask, instead of the entire task, agents can achieve
improved time and cost, resulting in higher overall utility and/or
higher profit. Second, considering subtasks separately gives agents
6
(10', 5¢)
(5',1¢)
(5', 2¢)
(2 ', 4¢)σ(R) 
⨝ 
γ(S) 
Figure 4: An example of a simple relational query that can be bro-
ken into 3 subtasks, corresponding to different operators.
the flexibility to outsource some computation to other agents. While
outsourcing computation across agents is not a focus of our work, it
is a natural fit for our fine-grained pricing mechanism. Agents can
choose to outsource subtasks to other agents based on their spe-
cialization and capabilities, or for load balancing. However, some
challenges of outsourcing, such as utility and forms of contracts
that agents need to exchange are beyond the scope of our current
work.
We model a computational task Q as a directed acyclic graph
(DAG) GQ. Every node in GQ is a subtask Qi. An edge between
subtasks (Qi,Q j) means that the output of Qi is an input to Q j.
When subtasks are independent of one another, the DAG may be
disconnected. Our model assumes no pipelining in subtask evalua-
tion. Therefore, a subtask Q j cannot be evaluated until all subtasks
Qi, such that (Qi,Q j) ∈ GQ, have completed their execution.
Given the graph representation GQ of a computational task, an
agent needs to determine a configuration φi ∈ Φ for each subtask
Qi ∈Q. This is in contrast with coarse-grained pricing (Section 4.2),
where the agent had to select a single configuration from Φ to be
used for each subtask of Q. When the agent chooses φi, the time
and cost of Qi is Ti(φi) and Ci(φi). A set of selected configurations
results in total cost CQ =∑Qi Ci(φi), i.e., the sum of the costs of all
subtasks. The completion time of Q is determined by the longest
path (P) in the task graph: TQ = maxP∈GQ ∑Qi∈P Ti(φi). Given de-
mand M and contract utility U , TQ and CQ determine the agent’s
profitP . The goal of the agent is to select the set of configurations
that maximizesP .
PROBLEM 5.1 (FINE-GRAINED CONTRACT PRICING). Given
graph GQ representing a task Q, and possible configurationsΦ, the
agent needs to specify a configuration φi ∈ Φ for each Qi ∈ Q, so
that the time TQ =maxP∈GQ ∑Qi∈P Ti(φi) and cost CQ =∑Qi Ci(φi)
maximize the overall profitP .
Our problem definition does not model data storage and transfer
time and costs explicitly. Rather, we assume that these are incorpo-
rated in the time and cost of a subtask (TQi and CQi ). This simplifies
the model and offers an upper bound on time and cost. In practice,
when two subsequent tasks share the same configuration, it is pos-
sible to reduce the costs of data passing, but these optimizations are
beyond the scope of this work.
We demonstrate the intricacies of the fine-grained pricing prob-
lem through a simple example. Figure 4 shows a relational query
with three distinct subtasks (operators): (1) select tuples from rela-
tion R, (2) aggregate on relation S, and (3) join of the results. We
assume deterministic times and costs to evaluate each subtask, de-
noted next to each node in Figure 4. The select and join subtasks
have only a single possible configuration each, but the aggregate
subtask has two. Assume the utility function is U(t,pi) = −t−pi ,
which means every one minute is worth 1 cent for the consumer.
Therefore, the configuration (2′,4¢) is better for the aggregate sub-
task, since it has higher utility than the configuration (5′,2¢). How-
ever, following a greedy strategy that picks the configuration that
is optimal for each subtask can result in sub-optimal utility for the
overall task. In this example, the join subtask has to wait 5 minutes
Algorithm 1 Fine-Grained Contract Pricing
Require: Q,GQ,Φ,P(T,C)
Ensure: maximumP
1: Add node Qterminal with 0 time and cost to GQ
2: for all Qi ∈Q do
3: Add edge (Qi,Qterminal) to GQ
4: Qorder⇐ TopologicalSort(GQ)
5: boundT ⇐ longest time to evaluate GQ
6: for all Qi ∈Qorder do
7: f (Qi,0)⇐ ∞
8: for t⇐ 1 to boundT do
9: f (Qi, t)⇐ f (Qi, t−1)
10: for all φ ∈Φ do
11: costφ ⇐ Combine
q∈pred(Qi)
( f (q, t−Ti(φ)))+Ci(φ)
12: if costφ < f (Qi, t) then
13: f (Qi, t)⇐ costφ
14: return maxtP(t, f (Qterminal , t))
for the select subtask to complete. Therefore, there is no benefit
in paying a higher price to complete the aggregate subtask sooner,
making (5′,2¢) a better configuration choice.
THEOREM 5.2. Fine-Grained Contract Pricing is NP-hard.
Our reduction follows from the discrete Knapsack problem (Ap-
pendix B). We next introduce a pseudo-polynomial dynamic pro-
gramming algorithm for this problem, and show that it is both ef-
ficient and effective in real-world task workflows (Section 7.3).
Without loss of generality, we assume that time and cost are de-
terministic, but the algorithm can be extended to the probabilistic
case in a straightforward way.
Algorithm 1 uses dynamic programming to compute the optimal
profit for task graphs. The algorithm derives the exact optimal so-
lution for cases where GQ is a tree (e.g., relational query operators)
and computes an approximation of the optimum for task graphs that
are DAGs.
In Algorithm 1, f (Qi, t) represents the minimum cost for evalu-
ating the subgraph terminated at subtask Qi when it takes at most
time t.4 Then, f (Qi, t) can be computed based on a combination of
the costs of the direct predecessors of Qi (pred(Qi)) in the task
workflow (lines 7–13). When GQ is a tree, the Combine func-
tion (line 11) is simply the sum of the costs of the predecessors
(∑q∈pred(Qi) f (q, t−Ti(φ))), and Algorithm 1 results in the optimal
profit.
If GQ is not a tree, predecessors of a subtask Qi can share com-
mon indirect predecessors, which introduces complex dependen-
cies in the choice of configurations across different subtrees. For
example, let q1,q2 ∈ pred(Qi), and q0 ∈ pred(q1)∩ pred(q2). There-
fore, q0 affects both subgraphs terminated at q1 and q2, respec-
tively. This impacts the Combine function in two ways. First, the
cost of q0 should be counted only once. Second, there may be
discrepancies in the configuration choice for q0 by the different
subgraphs. There are three strategies to resolve the discrepancy:
(1) use the configurations with minimum time T ; (2) use the config-
urations with minimum cost C; (3) use the configurations with max-
imumP(T,C). The Combine function applies the above strategies
one by one, computes the time TQi and cost CQi of the subgraph
terminated at Qi, and updates f (Qi, t) if TQi ≤ t and CQi is better.
4We turn the continuous space of time t into discrete space by
choosing an appropriate granularity (e.g., minute).
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Note that Strategy 1 guarantees a feasible solution whenever one
exists.
6. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Benchmark-Based Approach.
Floratou et al. [18] propose a Benchmark as a Service (BaaS)
approach to help consumers select configurations. This new BaaS
benchmarks user’s workload and use the optimal configuration to
execute the workload repetitively. As they mention in the paper,
changes such as growth of input data make BaaS complicated. So
a BaaS provider need to monitor and react to these changes. In our
approach, we do not make assumptions about the repetitiveness of
workloads. The disadvantage is that consumers may pay more for
repetitive workloads even when they are very similar. The advan-
tage is that consumers do not need to worry about the change of the
workloads.
We compare with the benchmark-based approach in Section 7.4.
VCG-Auction-Based Approach.
VCG auction is a pricing mechanism. Its strategy-proof prop-
erty makes it popular in many studies. We develop a VCG auction
model and compare it with our approach. In this VCG model, a
customer opens a bidding and agents bid on prices. Notice that this
model defines consumers payment according to the utility instead
of the pure price, which is different from the canonical VCG mode.
Assume agent i proposes its contract with utility Utili. The con-
sumer takes the contract with the highest utility Utili but pays based
on the second highest utility U∗ = max j 6=i(U j). The payment is a
piecewise function Ω(t) = ωk(t). From agent i’s perspective, its
cost function is Ci(t), so its payoff is:
payoff i =
E[profit] =
n
∑
k=1
pk(ωk(tˆk)−Ci(tˆk)) if Ui > max
j 6=i
(U j)
0 otherwise
Here is the definition of Ω(t) when U(t,pi) = −αU t − βUpi is
linear: Let ∆=Ui−U∗. The inverse function of U(t,pi) isΠ(t,u)=
(−αU t−u)/βU . We define Ω(t) =Π(t,u−∆) =Π(t,u)+∆/βU .
EXAMPLE 6.1. Suppose the utility function is U(t,pi) = −t −
2pi (0< t <∞). SoΠ(t,u) = (−t−u)/2. When ∆=Ui−U∗ = 10,
Ω(t) =Π(t,u−∆) = (−t− (u−10))/2 = (−t−u)/2+5.
THEOREM 6.2. When U(t,pi) is linear, the aboveΩ(t) satisfies:
1) Ui >U∗ >UCi ⇒ E[profit]< 0;
2) UCi >U
∗ >Ui⇒ E[profit]> 0.
The proof is in Appendix C. Given the payment function, we can
show that our developed VCG auction is strategyproof.
THEOREM 6.3. Every agent truthfully revealing its cost is a
weakly-dominant strategy.
In other words, every rational agent will make its cost be the
price in its contract. This proof is very similar to the proof for the
canonical VCG auction. Please refer to Appendix C for detailed
proof.
Our posted-price model and VCG auction model both exist in
the real world market. We discussed in the related work section
that neither of them dominates the other. They have 2 main differ-
ences in our case: 1) Posted-price model requires the agent to better
understand the demand function of the market. Then an agent can
set the price actively to gain more profit. In contrast, agents in VCG
auction only needs to truthfully reveal their costs, then the price is
passively decided based on the second best utility. 2) VCG auction
requires a centralized auctioneer who ensures the consumers pay
according to the second best utility. It makes a cross-platform mar-
ket more difficult to form. Posted-price model does not have such
requirement.
We quantitatively compare with the VCG-auction-based approach
in Section 7.4.
Differentiated Bertrand.
Multiple agents competing in the market is a typical differenti-
ated Bertrand model. Specifically, Bertrand model solves the equi-
librium of optimal prices based on all agents’ demand functions.
But in practice, an individual agent can hardly know other agents’
demand function when pricing in the market. So our model as-
sumes that each agent observes a demand function of its own price.
Such demand function is valid given the other agents’ current prices.
An agent will change its price when others change. The prices will
converge to the equilibrium in the long term. Now we show the
connection through an example.
In a differentiated Bertrand model, suppose there are 2 agents
numbered 1 and 2. Their prices are µ1 and µ2. Agent 1’s demand
function is M1(µ1,µ2) = γ−αµ1+βµ2 where α,β ,γ are positive
parameters. Higher µ1 means lower M1 but higher µ2 means higher
M1 due to competition. Similarly, M2(µ1,µ2) = γ−αµ2+βµ1. So
the overall profit P1 = M1(µ1,µ2) · µ1 5, P2 = M2(µ1,µ2) · µ2.
Given a fixed µ1, the best µ2 that maximizesP2 is:
µ∗2 = (γ+βµ1)/2α. (6.1)
Similarly, the best µ1 is:
µ∗1 = (γ+βµ2)/2α. (6.2)
So one can solve these two equations to get a Nash Equilibrium:
µ∗1 = µ
∗
2 = γ/(2α−β ).
In the real world, agents’ demand functions cannot be exactly the
same. Thus we should use different demand functions M1(µ1,µ2)=
γ1−α1µ1 +β1µ2 and M2(µ1,µ2) = γ2−α2µ1 +β2µ2. So µ∗1 =
(2α2γ1+β1γ2)/(4α1α2−β1β2) and µ∗2 =(2α1γ2+β2γ1)/(4α1α2−
β1β2).
The above calculation, however, requires that both agents know
both demand functions M1 and M2, which may not be a realistic
assumption; one may easily obtain one’s own demand function by
fitting historical data, but it may not be possible to know the other
party’s demand function. Without knowledge of the other party’s
demand function, one generally cannot settle for the NE (µ∗1 ,µ
∗
2 )
in one shot, but has to adjust one’s price dynamically according to
the observed demand function. Thus we have a repeated game here,
and rational agents will follow the best response functions 6.1 and
6.2. Our approach uses exactly the same response functions, where
the impact of the other agent’s price is absorbed into the intercept.
More precisely, in our model, Agent 1 tries to optimize M1(µ1) =
γ ′1−α1µ1 where γ ′1 = γ1 + β1µ2, so it sets µ1 = γ ′1/2α1 = (γ1 +
β1µ2)/2α1. Similarly, Agent 2 sets µ2 = (γ2+β2µ1)/2α2. If both
agents keep updating their prices in this manner, their prices will
eventually converge to the NE (µ∗1 ,µ
∗
2 ). Please refer to Appendix D
for more detail.
7. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
5The Bertrand model in [54] assumes marginal cost c = 0 for sim-
plicity. So the price in [54] corresponds to the profit in our ap-
proach. i.e. µ+ c = pi .
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Type CPU (virtual) Memory $/hour
db.m3.Medium 1 3.75GB $0.095
db.m3.Large 2 7.5GB $0.195
db.m3.xLarge 4 15GB $0.390
db.m3.2xLarge 8 30GB $0.775
db.r3.Large 2 15GB $0.250
db.r3.xLarge 4 30.5GB $0.500
db.r3.2xLarge 8 61GB $0.995
m1.Medium 1 3.75GB $0.109
m1.Large 2 7.5GB $0.219
m1.xLarge 4 15GB $0.438
Figure 5: Types of Amazon machines and associated features and
costs (in January 2015). The first 7 types (db.*) are RDS config-
urations, whereas the last 3 (m1.*) are EMR configurations. The
prefixes (db and m1) are omitted from some figures for brevity.
In this section we evaluate our market using a real-world cloud
computing platform: Amazon Web Services (AWS). Our experi-
ments collect real-world data from a variety of relational and MapRe-
duce task workloads, and use this data to simulate the behavior of
our market entities on the AWS cloud. Our results demonstrate that
our market framework offers incentives to consumers, who can ex-
ecute their tasks more cost-effectively, and to agents, who make
profit from providing fair and competitive contracts.
We proceed to describe our experimental setup, including com-
putational tasks, consumer parameters, and contracts.
Data and configurations.
We spent 8,106 machine hours and $3,118 in obtaining the dis-
tributions of time and cost for two types of computational tasks:
relational query workloads, and MapReduce jobs.
Relational query tasks: We use the queries and data of the TPC-H
benchmark to evaluate relational query workloads. We use all 22
queries of the benchmark on a 5GB dataset (scale factor 5). We
use the Amazon Relational Database Service (RDS) to evaluate the
workloads on 7 machine configurations, each of which has 200GB
of Provisioned IOPS SSD storage, and runs PostgreSQL 9.3.5. Fig-
ure 5 lists the capacity and hourly rate of each configuration.
MapReduce tasks: We evaluate MapReduce workloads using three
job types (WordCount, Sort, and Join) over 5GB of randomly gen-
erated input data. We use the Amazon Elastic MapReduce service
(EMR) to test our framework on these workloads. We select 3 ma-
chine configuration types. Figure 5 lists the capacities and hourly
rates of these configurations. We experimented with 4 different
sizes of clusters for each machine configuration: 1, 5, 10, and 20
slave nodes.
Scientific workflows: We use real-world scientific workflows that
represent computational tasks with multiple subtasks, to evaluate
fine-grained pricing (Section 5). We retrieved 1,454 workflows
from MyExperiment [14], one of the most popular scientific work-
flow repositories. These workflows were developed using Taverna
2 [71], and comprise the majority of workflows in the repository.
The size of workflows ranges from 1 to 154 subtasks.
Consumer models.
We simulate the consumer behavior in our framework using the
utility and demand functions.
Utility: In our evaluation, utility is a linear function U(t,pi) =
−αU t − βUpi modeling consumer preferences. αU represents the
unit cost that the consumer is willing to pay to save βU unit time.
For our experiments, we assume U(t,pi) =−t−pi , where t is mea-
sured in minutes and pi is measured in cents, which means every
minute is worth 1 cent to the consumer.
Demand: In our evaluation, the demand function is linear: M(U)=
γM +λMU , which means that when U increases by 1/λM , 1 more
contract would be accepted. We use M(U) = 100+50U for RDS,
and M(U) = 100+ 5U for EMR. λM is smaller for EMR because
the times and costs for MapReduce jobs are much larger than those
of relational queries.
Contracts.
All our experiments involve contracts with a deadline, which
means that every consumer request specifies one target completion
time. We execute each task 100 times using every configuration
and set the deadline of each query as the average completion time
across all configurations.
7.1 Consumer incentives
In this section, we evaluate whether our market framework offers
sufficient incentive for consumers to participate in the market. Our
first set of experiments simulates several naïve cloud users who se-
lect one of the default configurations for their computational tasks:
7 configurations for RDS, and 12 configurations for EMR. Then
we simulate a baseline user who intuitively chooses configurations
based on a simple feature of a task. Specifically, the user chooses a
configuration with the best CPU performance for a CPU-intensive
task, or a configuration with the best IO performance for an IO-
intensive task. Predicting whether a task is CPU-intensive or IO-
intensive is a difficult task for a user. However, we unfairly bias
toward this baseline by indeed executing the task to measure its
CPU time and IO time. We consider a task is CPU-intensive if its
CPU time is greater, otherwise IO-intensive. Finally we simulate
an expert agent, who, for every task, selects the configuration that
maximizes the consumer’s utility function. Figure 6a presents the
price and time achieved by each of the 7 default configurations for
RDS, as well as the price and time offered by the expert agent. The
line in the graph is the utility indifference curve for the agent’s con-
figuration, representing points with the same utility value. Points
on the curve are equally good, from the consumer’s perspective, as
the one achieved by the expert agent. Points above the curve have
worse utility values (less preferable than the agent’s offer), while
points below the curve have better utility values (more preferable
than the agent’s offer).
Our experiments show that the expert agent provides more utility
to 4 out of 8 naïve cloud users with relational query tasks on RDS.
This means that, even though the agent makes a profit, a good por-
tion of the users would still benefit from using the market instead of
relying on default settings. This effect is even more pronounced for
EMR workloads. Figure 6c shows that the expert agent offers better
utility to all simulated naïve users. This means that, in every single
case, the consumers get better utility by using the agent’s services,
instead of selecting a default configuration. It is noteworthy that the
heuristic-based baseline approach is 189% and 67% worse in utility
than our approach for RDS and EMR workloads, respectively.
7.2 Agent incentives and market properties
In this section we demonstrate that the pricing framework satis-
fies three important properties: competitiveness, fairness, and re-
silience. These properties incentivize consumers and agents to use
and trust the market by ensuring that (a) the agents will identify
efficient computation plans and provide accurate pricing, and (b)
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Figure 6: (a, c) Users achieve better utility by using an expert agent, compared to naïvely selecting a default configuration. The agent benefits
40% of the consumers in RDS workloads, and 100% of the consumers in EMR workloads. (b, d) Expert agents always achieve the largest
profits. This means that our market framework gives incentives to agents to find optimal configurations.
Task Configuration
RDS
q1–q3, q5–q16, q18, q22 db.r3.Large
q4, q17, q19, q20 db.r3.xLarge
q21 db.r3.2xLarge
EMR
WordCount m1.Medium × 20
Sort m1.Large × 5
Join m1.xLarge × 1
Figure 7: The expert agents select different configurations for dif-
ferent tasks to maximize profit.
inaccurate estimates will not pose a great risk to the agents. A theo-
retical analysis of the market properties is included in Appendix A.
Competitiveness.
We run experiments on Amazon RDS and EMR to demonstrate
how different configurations impact profitability in practice. Our
goal is to show that, in our market, well-informed, expert agents
can make more profit than naïve agents, thus creating incentives
for agents to be competitive and offer configurations and contracts
that benefit the consumers. In this experiment, a naïve agent selects
one configuration to use for all queries. In contrast, the expert agent
always selects the optimal configuration for each query. The goal
of this experiment is to show the impact of configuration selection.
Thus we control for other parameters, such as the accuracy of the
agents’ estimates. So, for now, we assume that all agents know the
distributions of time and cost accurately. We relax this assumption
in later experiments.
We generate histograms of time and cost by evaluating each query
with each configuration 100 times. All agents use these histograms
to approximate the distributions and price contracts based on these
distributions. After an agent prices a contract, we compute the
number of accepted contracts according to the demand function,
M(U). Then we randomly select M executions to do trials. The
agent receives payments based on whether the execution met or
missed the deadline.
Figure 6b illustrates the total profit made by each agent pricing
RDS workloads. There are 7 naïve agents, each using one of the
RDS configurations from Figure 5, and one expert agent, who al-
ways uses the best configuration for each task. Figure 6d illustrates
the same experiment on EMR workloads. We use one expert agent
and 12 naïve agents who used the three EMR configurations from
Figure 5, each with a cluster size of 1, 5, 10, or 20 nodes. Figure 7
lists the configuration chosen by the expert agent for each RDS and
each EMR task. In both experiments, the expert agent achieves the
highest overall profit.
Figures 6b and 6d also show the utilities offered by the agents for
the same contracts. We plot the relative utility of each naïve agent,
using the utility of the expert agent as a baseline: AgentUtility−ExpertUtility|ExpertUtility| .
On both RDS and EMR workloads, the utility offered by the expert
was the best among all agents.
Our experiments on both RDS and EMR demonstrate that expert
agents achieve better utility and profit than all other agents. This
verifies empirically that our market design ensures incentives for
agents to improve their estimation techniques and configuration se-
lection mechanisms. This benefits both consumers, who get better
utility, and agents, who get more profit.
Fairness.
Fairness guarantees the incentive for agents to present accurate
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Figure 8: Agents’ estimates are often inaccurate, and such inaccu-
racies can lead to loss of profit.
estimates to consumers. If the agent uses inaccurate estimates,
she/he will be penalized with lower profits. Our goal is to show
that more accurate estimates lead to greater profit for the agent in
practice.
We consider an agent using db.m3.medium on RDS and Post-
greSQL’s default query optimizer to estimate the completion times
of queries. The PostgreSQL optimizer provides an estimate of the
expected completion time and the agent assumes a Gaussian distri-
bution with a mean value equal to the completion time predicted by
the optimizer. We chose 0.05 for the standard deviation, which is
very close to the actual average standard deviation of the distribu-
tions of the 22 TPC-H queries (0.04).
We also consider another agent using m1.medium on EMR, with
one master and one slave node. The agent estimates the expected
completion time by executing queries on a 5% sample of the data,
and assumes a Gaussian distribution around the estimated mean.
The agent uses an empirical standard deviation, 0.55, which is close
to the average true standard deviation of all three EMR job types
(0.56).
We compare the agents’ estimate with the true distributions in
Figures 8a and 8b. We plot the average completion time for each
TPC-H query and each EMR task. The standard deviation is very
low (under 0.75 min) for all tasks. As these plots show, the agents’
estimates can often be far from the actual completion times (e.g.,
q18).
Next, we use the similarity between two distributions and rela-
tive loss to show the relationship between estimation accuracy and
profit. We compare the true distribution of completion time (which
is a histogram) with the agent’s estimate (a Gaussian distribution)
by turning the agent’s estimate into a histogram and computing
the cosine similarity between two histograms. The relative loss
measures how much profit the agents lose compared to the optimal
profit they could have made. We define relative loss of profit as:
RelativeLoss =
OptimalPro f it−ActualPro f it
OptimalPro f it
(7.1)
As Figures 8c and 8d illustrate, when the agent’s estimate is more
accurate, the relative loss is smaller.
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Figure 9: Poor estimation moderately impacts the market.
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Figure 10: By adjusting for risk, agents can reduce their losses in
case of inaccurate estimates.
Our market does not rely on the assumption that the estimates are
accurate, and it can in fact tolerate inaccuracies well. As long as
there exists at least one task for which an agent can produce better
estimates than a consumer, the agent offers utility to the market. In
our experimental evaluation, we showed that this is easy to achieve
in practice: even agents using simple estimation methods (such as
using the PostgreSQL optimizer or sampling), which result in fairly
inaccurate estimates, can provide benefit to non-expert consumers.
Existing research has shown that time and cost estimation is non-
trivial [1, 27, 74], and agents using such specialized tools would
always produce better estimates than non-expert consumers.
In addition, we further expanded our evaluation to study an ex-
treme case: when all agents in the market make worse estimation
than all consumers, for all tasks. We multiply the agents’ estimated
time and cost by a coefficient. A > 1 coefficient means overestima-
tion and a < 1 coefficient means underestimation.
As depicted in Figure 9a, overestimation leads agents to post
higher prices lowering the consumers’ utilities. However, switch-
ing to using the cloud provider directly becomes preferable (on av-
erage) only when agents overestimate substantially: in our empiri-
cal simulation, agents had to overestimate time and cost by 49% in
RDS workloads, and by 120% in EMR workloads before a switch
was beneficial to consumers on average.
On the other hand, figure 9b shows that underestimation of time
and cost decreases an agent’s profit by 2% in RDS and 36% in EMR
if it underestimates time and cost by a factor of 10. Depending on
the agents’ profit margins, they may be able to absorb the differ-
ence without losses. To avoid losses, agents can follow risk-aware
pricing strategies (Section 4.3).
Resilience.
The property of resilience provides assurances to the agents, by
ensuring that inaccurate estimates will not pose a significant risk
to the agents’ profits. This property is crucial, as errors in the es-
timates are very common [5, 15, 74]. Our framework ensures re-
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Figure 11: DP outperforms Greedy and Search
silience to these inaccuracies by accounting for risk (Definition 4.4).
Specifically, the agents can profit by adjusting the risk they prefer
to take. According to Equation 4.9, the risk is part of the objective
and controlled by a parameter λ . When λ is large, the agent has
low confidence in the estimate (conservative). This setting reduces
the loss of profit if the agent’s estimate is inaccurate.
We again consider an RDS agent using db.m3.medium and the
default PostgreSQL optimizer, and an EMR agent using m1.medium
and sampling to estimate runtime. We evaluate relative loss using
Equation 7.1 and plot it for different values of λ (Figure 10). A
value of λ = 0 means that the agent is confident that their estimate
is correct. However, since in this case the estimates were inaccu-
rate, the relative loss for λ = 0 is high: the agents’ profit is much
lower than the optimal profit they could have achieved. For both
agents (EMR and RDS), the relative loss decreases for higher val-
ues of λ . This shows that by adjusting for risk, the agents can
reduce loss of profit.
7.3 Fine-grained pricing
In our final set of experiments, we evaluate fine-grained pricing
(Algorithm 1) against a large dataset of real-world scientific work-
flows [14]. This dataset is well-suited for this experiment, as it
provides diverse computational flows of varied sizes and complexi-
ties. The published workflows do not report real execution informa-
tion (time and cost), and we are not aware of any public workflow
repositories that provide this information. Therefore, we augment
the real workflow graphs with synthetic time and cost histograms
for each subtask, drawn from random Gaussian distributions with
means in the [1,100] range, and variances in the [0,5] range. Each
subtask has 5 candidate configurations with different time and cost
histograms. We compute the profit using utility U(t,pi) = −t−pi
and demand M(U) = 100+ 0.01U (Section 4.2). We set λM (the
coefficient of U) to a smaller value than the ones used for RDS
and EMR workloads, because the completion times and costs for
workflows are much larger.
First, we evaluate our Dynamic Programming algorithm (Algo-
rithm 1) against two baselines: (1) an exhaustive search strategy
(Search) that explores all possible configuration assignments, and
(2) a greedy strategy (Greedy) that selects the configuration that
leads to the maximum local profit for each subtask. We perform
10 repetitions for each workflow, using different random time and
cost distributions for each repetition. Figure 11a shows the relative
profit achieved by Search and DP compared to Greedy: P−PGreedyPGreedy .
DP achieves better profits than Greedy, and the effect increases for
larger workflows: for workflows with 154 subtasks, DP achieves
50.0% higher profit than Greedy. Search provides few data points,
as it cannot scale to larger graphs. For small workflows (up to 12
subtasks) Search and DP select equivalent configurations that result
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Figure 12: Pricing at finer granularities can vastly increase the
agents’ profits.
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Figure 13: Consumers prefer our approach to benchmark except
for highly repetitive workloads
in the same (optimal) profit. Figure 11b shows the running time of
the three algorithms. As expected, exhaustive search quickly be-
comes infeasible, and Greedy is faster than DP. However, the run-
time of DP remains low even for larger workflows. Combined with
the profit gains over Greedy, this experiment demonstrates that Al-
gorithm 1 is highly effective for fine-grained pricing.
Second, we evaluate the benefits of fine-grained pricing, com-
pared to coarse-grained pricing. Figure 12 shows the profit achieved
by DP, which assigns a configuration to each subtask, relative to
the optimal single configuration for the entire workflow. In this ex-
periment, fine-grained pricing doubled the agents’ profits for small
workflows, compared to coarse-grained pricing, and the gains in-
crease as workflows grow larger. For the largest workflows in our
dataset, fine-grained pricing achieved 12.5 times higher profits.
7.4 Comparison with Alternative Approaches
Benchmark-based Approach.
Contrasting our work with Benchmarking as a Service (BaaS) [18]
is meaningful when workload repetition is significant. We assume a
consumer who repeate RDS and EMR workloads without any mod-
ifications, and with each repetition tested a different configuration;
once all configurations were tested, the consumer would continue
using the best one in subsequent repetitions. For this experiment,
we limited the number of possible configurations to 7 for RDS and
12 for EMR. This biases the experiment in favor of benchmark-
ing, as in practice the number of configurations that the consumer
would have to try is much higher. In this simplified setting, we
found that it took 12 repetitions in RDS and 68 repetitions in EMR
before the consumer would start benefiting from benchmarking. In
the real world, these numbers are much higher, as cloud providers
offer way more configurations than the ones we considered here.
Cluster size alone causes an explosion in the number of options,
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Figure 14: VCG auction brings less profit to agents without nec-
essarily reducing consumers’ payments. (PP = our posted-price
approach)
so having an agent with an analytical model, such as in [27] , is
necessary.
In practice, BaaS has additional challenges: As discussed in [18],
data growth and changes in the input make BaaS complicated. Work-
loads are almost never repeated exactly, as the input changes be-
tween executions, requiring the BaaS provider to monitor and re-
act to changes. Moreover, cloud providers change machine types,
parameters, and pricing very frequently — e.g., between 2012 and
2015, AWS introduced on average 2.6 new instances every three
months. When these settings change, resource selection needs to
be re-evaluated, even if a workload stays the same.
VCG-auction-based Approach.
In this experiment, we compare our model with an VCG auction
model. In a strategy-proof VCG auction, the agents truthfully re-
veal their best costs of executing a task. Then the consumer selects
the agent with the best utility but pays according to the second best
utility. Therefore, given a specific task, only the best and the sec-
ond best agents’ contract together define the price. So we create
one agent who is always able to find the best configuration for each
task, and another agent who is doing just worse than the best one.
We assume a delta ∆ that is the difference between the best utility
and the second best utility, and vary this delta to see how much
profit the best agent can get.
As depicted in Figure 14, when ∆ becomes greater, the best
agent’s profit goes up but then drops down. This is because of the
demand. Larger ∆ means more profit of each contract but less de-
mand. So the profit reaches maximum at a certain point. Even this
maximum VCG profit is less than the profit in our approach. It is
because our approach optimizes the profit for each individual task
in a workload, while the VCG approach in this experiment applies
unified profit. Moreover, when ∆ gets greater, consumers’ average
payment for each contract is bigger. This is by definition of VCG.
The VCG’s average payment goes higher than our approach’s when
∆ is very small. In a word, our approach brings more profit to agents
without necessarily increasing consumer’s payment.
8. RELATED WORK
In contrast to our market framework, which emphasizes the con-
sumer need for task-level pricing, existing work on cloud pricing
largely focuses on resource usage. One study used game theory to
model a pricing framework where consumers compete with each
other to maximize their utilities [6, 21]. Specifically, each con-
sumer has a demand on resources, and their utility is a function of
demand and price. A choice of price by a service provider triggers a
change in the consumers’ demands to maximize their utilities, thus
affecting the provider’s revenue. This work makes two key assump-
tions that are not present in our framework. First, the chosen utility
functions indicate that the quality of service (QoS) degrades when
consumers share resources. While meaningful for resources such as
wireless bandwidth, this assumption has been shown to not always
hold in many types of resources relevant to computation [3, 4]. In
fact, QoS can improve when, for example, consumers share data
and cache, and agents in our framework can take advantage of this
to make more profit. Second, it is assumed that the consumers know
each other’s demands and strategies, and adjust their demands ac-
cordingly. In contrast, in our framework we consider consumers’
tasks separately and use probability distributions to model runtime
and financial cost, leading to a simpler yet practical model.
Variants of pricing mechanisms assume that providers price dy-
namically, based on the consumer arrival and departure rates [7,
45, 76, 77, 78]. In turn, prices also guide consumer demand. In
a different direction, Ibrahim et al. [28] argue that the interference
across virtual machines sharing the same hardware leads to over-
charging. They suggest cloud providers to price based on effective
virtual machine time. This framework guarantees benefits to con-
sumers and urges providers to improve their system design.
Wong et al. [31] have compared three different pricing strategies
in terms of fairness and revenue: (1) Bundled pricing, in which
providers sell resource bundles (e.g., virtual machine with CPU,
memory, and other resources) to consumers; (2) Resource pric-
ing, in which providers charge consumers separate prices for the
consumed resources; (3) Differentiated pricing, in which providers
charge consumers personalized prices. They define fairness as a
function of equitability and efficiency of utilities among all con-
sumers and conclude that differentiated pricing provides the best
fairness. They treat consumers’ jobs identically and define fairness
based on the number of jobs that are successfully executed by the
cloud provider. They do not consider the connection between un-
certain completion time and utility.
Economic-based resource allocation has been extensively stud-
ied in grid computing [10, 9, 24, 52, 34]. Researchers have devel-
oped different economic models in two main categories: “commod-
ity markets” and “auctions”. In a commodity market, resources are
sold at a posted-price. The price of resources affects consumers’
utility and demand, and therefore impacts the providers’ profit.
Finding the equilibrium is the main focus in these models. Yeo
et al. proposed a utility-driven pricing function [80, 56] and an au-
tonomic pricing approach [81]. Stuer et al. [58] adapted Smale’s
method [57] to price resources in grid computing markets. Bossen-
broek et al. [8] introduced option contracts into the market and used
hedge strategies to reduce consumers’ risk of missing task dead-
lines. Auction-based pricing in grid computing contains several
different forms. Double auction requires consumers and providers
to publish their requests and offers in a marketplace [25, 59, 69,
29]. Vickrey auction is a type of sealed-bid auction in which the
highest bidder wins but pays the second-highest bid [65, 46]. Com-
binatorial auction allows consumers to bid on combinations of re-
sources [13].
Posted-price selling and auctions are both established ways of
selling, and it is not clear which one is better. The key challenge is
the uncertainty of the value of the commodity (in this case, the com-
putational resource) and researchers have developed different mod-
els to compare the two mechanisms under various assumptions.
Computer scientists measure system metrics in these two mecha-
nisms. Wolski et al. [70] state that posted-price brings more price
stability, higher task completion rate and higher resource utiliza-
tion ratio than auctions. Vanmechelen and Broeckhove [63] con-
clude that posted-price results in more stable pricing, while Vick-
rey auction results in fewer message passing in dynamic pricing.
Economists have discussed the revenues in these two mechanisms.
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Wang [67] compares posted-price selling and auctions where the
buyers have independent private values of the commodity. He finds
that posted-price selling brings more profit to the seller when the
buyers’ values of the commodity are widely dispersed. Campbell
and Levin [11] state that auctions perform worse than posted-price
when buyer valuations are interdependent. Hammond [22, 23] con-
cludes that revenues of the two mechanisms cannot be statistically
distinguished based on his study on eBay.
In contrast to our framework, this entire body of work focuses on
resource-level pricing, and does not provide a mechanism for con-
sumers to select resources based on their tasks. Recent work has
started shifting the focus to task-level pricing. Floratou et al. [18]
propose a Benchmark as a Service (BaaS) that benchmarks user’s
workload and suggests the optimal configuration for repetitive ex-
ecution. As they mention in the paper, changes such as growth of
input data make BaaS complicated. In our approach, we do not as-
sume repetitiveness of workloads. Consumers may pay more for
extremely repetitive workloads, but are free from benchmarking
evolved workloads.
Auction-based models [60, 61] assume that providers bid for ser-
vice contracts. These models use the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auc-
tion mechanism, which redefines the payment to the winner and
guarantees that all providers report their true cost of providing the
service. While this work provides a good model for task-level pric-
ing, it does not consider execution time for tasks. In our frame-
work, we balance the consumers’ trade-off of execution time and
price through their utility function.
Personalized Service Level Agreements (PSLA) [47, 48, 49, 50]
resemble the contracts in our framework, and describe a vision of
a system that analyzes consumers’ data and suggests to them tiers
of service. Each tier describes three properties: completion time,
price per hour, querying capabilities. For example, a tier on Ama-
zon EMR can be (< 3.5 minutes, $0.12/hour, SELECT 1 attribute
FROM 1 table WHERE condition). In our framework, consumers
do not subscribe to a tier of service, but rather provide the task they
need and the agent provides a specific price for the task.
When multiple agents find the same best configuration for some
tasks, their prices affect each other and finally converge to the Nash
Equilibrium in differentiated Bertrand model [54] in the long run.
The agents in our computation framework derive estimates of
cost and time. Several approaches employ machine learning to pre-
dict the execution time of a query [19, 5]. Li et al. [37] use statisti-
cal model to estimate CPU time and other resource comsumption.
Duggan et al. [15, 16] introduce special metrics and predict perfor-
mance based on sampling. Wu et al. analyze the query execution
plan directly to derive runtime predictions [73, 72], or use prob-
abilistic models [74]. Ye et al. [79] perform service composition
given the resource requirement of individual tasks. Uncertainty of
time and cost is an important component in our framework. Exist-
ing work on scheduling SLAs considers uncertainty in the comple-
tion time when contracts specify a price. Specifically, scheduling
considers 3 possible outcomes: (1) the provider accepts the SLA
and returns results before the deadline, earning some profit; (2)
the provider accepts the SLA but misses the deadline, and pays
some penalty to the consumer; (3) the provider rejects the SLA and
pays some penalty immediately. Xiong et al. [75] have developed
an SLA admission control system that predicts the distribution of
completion time, and accepts or rejects SLAs based on the expected
profit. Chi et al. [12] assume a stream of SLAs all of which must
be accepted. Their system minimizes loss by determining the exe-
cution order of SLAs based on the uncertain completion time and
the penalty of missing the deadline. Liu et al. [39] have proposed
an algorithm to solve tenant placement in the cloud given the dis-
tribution of completion time and the penalty of SLAs. Our market
works differently in two aspects. First, our contracts consist of mul-
tiple target times, which are more flexible than the single deadline
implicit in these SLAs. Second, we do not require the consumer to
propose an SLA that may be rejected. Instead, the consumer makes
a request that is priced by the agent according to their capabilities.
Fine-grained contract pricing is related to query optimization in
distributed databases [36, 20] as we execute subtasks using dif-
ferent virtual machines. However, contract optimization has two
objectives (time and cost), while query optimization has only one
(time). These two objectives propagate differently in the task graph,
making the problem more difficult.
9. DISCUSSION
Our framework can be easily extended to handle applications
with different QoS parameters. For example, in long-running ser-
vices, completion time is not relevant and thus should not be part
of the utility function. In contrast, other factors, such as response
time, are important. These parameters are also uncertain due to un-
stable cloud performance [41, 68]. While we did not experiment
with alternative QoS parameters and different application settings,
our market framework is already equipped to handle them with ap-
propriate changes to the utility function.
A meaningful extension to our work is to augment the market to
handle varying prices. Our current framework assumes fixed prices
for resource configurations. However, fluctuating prices do exist in
the real world. For example, Amazon EC2 allows agents bid spot
instances with much lower price [83, 2]. Agents set a maximum
price threshold when requesting a spot instance. The request can
be fulfilled when the market price of a spot instance is lower than
this threshold. If the market price increases above the threshold,
the spot instance will be terminated. In addition, agents can rent
reserved instances either directly from Amazon EC2 or through its
Reserved Instance Marketplace. In these cases, agents have more
options to execute a task: 1) buy spot instances; 2) use their pre-
viously reserved instances; 3) buy reserved instances from others.
These options introduce two additional factors to the market. First,
the market needs to account for a supply function S(αC, t). This
means there are S(αC, t) instances with rate αC and available time t,
where αC is usually lower than the regular instance rate and t must
be a limited period ranging from hours to years. Second, the frame-
work needs to consider the starting time of a task. The starting time
is inconsequential when there are only regular instances with fixed
rates: The agent starts regular instances whenever a consumer ac-
cepts the contract. However, the starting time matters when the
rates fluctuate. In this case, agents need to estimate (a) the sup-
ply function at different points in time to ensure enough machine
hours for finishing consumers’ tasks, and (b) the demand function
at different points in time to decide how many instances they want
to reserve. This is not a straightforward extension to our work, and
will likely lead to a more complex market model.
10. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a new marketplace framework that con-
sumers can use to pay for well-defined database computations in
the cloud. In contrast with existing pricing mechanisms, which
are largely resource-centric, our framework introduces agent ser-
vices that can leverage a plethora of existing tools for time, cost
estimation, and scheduling, to provide consumers with personal-
ized cloud-pricing contracts targeting a specific computational task.
Agents price contracts to maximize the utility offered to consumers
while also producing a profit for their services. Our market can op-
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erate in conjunction with existing cloud markets, as it does not alter
the way cloud providers offer and price services. It simplifies cloud
use for consumers by allowing them to compare contracts, rather
than choose resources directly. The market also allows users to
extract more value from public cloud resources, achieving cheaper
and faster query processing than naive configurations, while a por-
tion of this value is earned by the agents as profit for their services.
Our experimental evaluation using the AWS cloud computing plat-
form demonstrated that our market framework offers incentives to
consumers, who can execute their tasks more cost-effectively, and
to agents, who make profit from providing fair and competitive con-
tracts.
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APPENDIX
A. LINEAR CASE
We provide an analytical solution to the linear case, in which the
utility function U and demand function M are linear:
• The consumers specifies a linear utility function U(t,pi)=−αU ·
t−βU ·pi , which means they are always willing to pay αU units
of cost to save βU units of time.
• The demand function is linear: M(U) = γM + λM ·U , which
means that when U increased by 1/λM , 1 more contract would
be accepted. Since U(t,pi) is linear, the demand function can
be written as M(U) = γM−αMt−βMpi .
Applying Equations 4.6 and 4.7 to Problem 4.2, we compute the
overall profit as:
P =
|I|
∑
i=1
(pii− ci)pi ·
|I|
∑
i=1
M (U(tˆi,pii)) pi
=(pi− c)T p ·
(
γM−αM tˆT p−βMpiT p
)
=−βM
(
piT p− γM−αM tˆ
T p+βMcT p
2βM
)2
+
(γM−αM tˆT p−βMcT p)2
4βM
P is maximized when
piT p =

γM−αM tˆT p+βMcT p
2βM
, γM−αM tˆT p−βMcT p≥ 0
cT p+ ε, otherwise
where ε is a small positive value.
Furthermore, when γM−αM tˆT p−βMcT p≥ 0,
P =
(γM−αM tˆT p−βMcT p)2
4βM
(A.1)
EXAMPLE A.1. Let I = [0,∞); then p1 = 1, and tˆ1 is the ex-
pected completion time. The only variable is pi1. The problem be-
comes:
maximize :
P =(pi1− c1) · (γM−αM tˆ1−βMpi1)
subject to :
E[pro f it] = (pi1− c1)> 0
The result for the price pi1 is:
pi1 = max
(
γM−αM tˆ1 +βMc1
2βM
,c1 + ε
)
We denote a configuration by its probability, time, and cost tuple:
(p, tˆ,c). We can apply utility function directly to this configuration
as E[U(p, tˆ,c)] = −αU tˆT p−βUpiT p. We define that a configura-
tion (p1, tˆ1,c1) is better than another configuration (p2, tˆ2,c2)when
E[U(p1, tˆ1,c1)]> E[U(p2, tˆ2,c2)]. If an agent finds a better config-
uration than another configuration, she/he can provide consumers
greater utility (defined in Equation 4.2) while making more profit
(defined in Equation 4.8). Formally:
THEOREM A.2. When E[U(p1, tˆ1,c1)] > E[U(p2, tˆ2,c2)], con-
sumer’s utility E[U1]> E[U2] and overall profitP1 >P2.
PROOF. We ignore the corner case in which γM−αM tˆT p−βMcT p<
0, which means even the most efficient configuration found by the
agent leads to zero demand. When γM−αM tˆT p−βMcT p≥ 0, ac-
cording to Section 4.2, the overall profit P is maximized when
piT p = γM−αM tˆ
T p+βMcT p
2βM . So
E[U ] =−αU tˆT p−βUpiT p
=−αU tˆT p−βU γM−αM tˆ
T p+βMcT p
2βM
=−αU tˆT p−βU γM−λMαU tˆ
T p+λMβU cT p
2λMβU
=− γM
2λM
− αU tˆ
T p
2
− βU c
T p
2
=− γM
2λM
+
1
2
E[U(p, tˆ,c)]
So E[U1]> E[U2] if E[U(p1, tˆ1,c1)]> E[U(p2, tˆ2,c2)].
In addition,
P =
(γM−αM tˆT p−βMcT p)2
4βM
=
(γM−λMαU tˆT p−λMβU cT p)2
4βM
=
(γM +λME[U(p, tˆ,c)])2
4βM
Since γM−αM tˆT p−βMcT p= γM+λME[U(p, tˆ,c)]≥ 0,P1 >P2
if E[U(p1, tˆ1,c1)]> E[U(p2, tˆ2,c2)].
B. FINE-GRAINED PRICING
THEOREM B.1. Contract optimization in fine-grained pricing
is NP-hard.
PROOF. We prove this by reducing a 0-1 Knapsack problem to
it. In a knapsack problem, there are n items, each of which has a
value vi and a weight wi. The maximum weight of a knapsack is W .
One wants to maximize the sum of values V of selected items while
the sum of their weights does not exceed W . We construct a con-
tract optimization problem correspondingly. We make n subtasks in
a chain. Their time and cost are deterministic. The ith subtask has
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two options (wi,v0− vi) and (0,v0), where v0 = maxi{vi}. Then
let the overall profit be
P(T,C) =
{
n∗ v0−C T ≤W
0 T >W
So one can achieve value V in the knapsack problem without ex-
ceeding weight limit W if and only if the P = V in the contract
optimization problem.
C. VCG-AUCTION-BASED APPROACH
Recall the definition of Ω(t): When U(t,pi) = −αU t − βUpi is
linear, let ∆=Ui−U∗. The inverse function of U(t,pi) is Π(t,u) =
(−αU t−u)/βU . We define Ω(t) =Π(t,u−∆) =Π(t,u)+∆/βU .
THEOREM C.1. When U(t,pi) is linear, the above Ω(t) satis-
fies:
1) Ui >U∗ >UCi ⇒ E[profit]< 0;
2) UCi >U
∗ >Ui⇒ E[profit]> 0.
PROOF.
1) ∆=Ui−U∗ and Ui >U∗ >UCi
⇒ ∆<Ui−UCi = ∑nk=1 pk[U(tˆk,pik)−U(tˆk,ck)]⇒ ∑nk=1 pk[U(tˆk,pik)−U(tˆk,ck)]−∆> 0.
0≤ pk ≤ 1 and ∑nk=1 pk = 1⇒ ∆= ∑nk=1 pk∆.
So ∑nk=1 pk[U(tˆk,pik)−∆−U(tˆk,ck)]> 0⇒ ∑nk=1 pk(−βUpik−∆+βU ck)> 0.
So E[profit] =∑nk=1 pk(ωk(tˆk)−Ci(tˆk)) =−∑nk=1 pk(−βUpik−∆+
βU ck)< 0.
Therefore Ui >U∗ >UCi ⇒ E[profit]< 0;
2) Similar to above, we can prove UCi >U
∗ >Ui⇒ E[profit] >
0.
THEOREM C.2. Every agent truthfully revealing its cost is a
weakly-dominant strategy.
PROOF. Truthfully bidding means Ui =UCi .
1) The strategy of overbidding, Ui >UCi , is dominated by truth-
fully bidding.
When U∗ >Ui >UCi , both strategies yield payoff i = 0.
When Ui >UCi >U
∗, both strategies yield payoff i = E[profit]>
0.
However, when Ui > U∗ > UCi , overbidding yields payoff i =
E[profit]< 0 (Theorem C.1) while truthfully bidding yields payoff i =
0.
So overbidding is dominated by truthfully bidding.
2) The strategy of underbidding, Ui <UCi , is dominated by truth-
fully bidding.
When U∗ >UCi >Ui, both strategies yield payoff i = 0.
When UCi >Ui >U
∗, both strategies yield payoff i = E[profit]>
0.
However, when UCi > U
∗ > Ui, underbidding yields payoff i =
0 while truthfully bidding yields payoff i = E[profit] > 0 (Theo-
rem C.1).
So underbidding is dominated by truthfully bidding.
So truthfully bidding is a weakly-dominant strategy.
D. BERTRAND MODEL
Recall that in the Differentiated Bertrand Model with nonidenti-
cal demand functions, the best response functions are given by
µ1 = f1(µ2) = a1µ2 +b1, (D.1)
µ2 = f2(µ1) = a2µ1 +b2, (D.2)
where
ai =
βi
2αi
, bi =
γi
2αi
, for i = 1,2.
If a1a2 < 1, there exists a Nash Equilibrium (µ∗1 ,µ
∗
2 ), which is the
unique solution to the following equations,{
µ∗1 = f1(µ
∗
2 ),
µ∗2 = f2(µ
∗
1 ).
Suppose that both agents keep updating their prices to the best
response to the currently observed price of the other party. We show
that their prices eventually converges to the NE (µ∗1 ,µ
∗
2 ).
We allow for asynchronous updates. Thus at the x-th update,
there are three possibilities,
(1) Only agent 1 updates his prices, in which case
(µ1,x+1,µ2,x+1) = F1(µ1,x,µ2,x) = ( f1(µ2,x),µ2,x). (D.3)
(2) Only agent 2 updates his prices, in which case
(µ1,x+1,µ2,x+1) = F2(µ1,x,µ2,x) = (µ1,x, f2(µ1,x)). (D.4)
(3) Both agents update their prices, in which case
(µ1,x+1,µ2,x+1) = F3(µ1,x,µ2,x) = ( f1(µ2,x), f2(µ1,x)).
(D.5)
Thus (µ1,x,µ2,x) = Gx ◦Gx−1 ◦ · · · ◦G1(µ1,0,µ2,0), where µ1,0 and
µ2,0 are the initial prices, and Gi ∈ {F1,F2,F3} for i = 1,2, . . . ,x.
We assume that both agents keep updating their prices, i.e.,
lim
x→∞
x
∑
i=1
1{Gi 6= F1}= limx→∞
x
∑
i=1
1{Gi 6= F2}= ∞. (D.6)
THEOREM D.1. Assume a1a2 < 1. If both agents keep updating
their prices, i.e. (D.6) holds, then for any initial prices µ1,0 and
µ2,0, we have
lim
x→∞(µ1,x,µ2,x) = (µ
∗
1 ,µ
∗
2 ).
PROOF. For any function f , let f (0) = id, the identity function,
and f (m) = f (m−1) ◦ f for m≥ 1. Note that F(2)i = Fi and F3 ◦Fi =
F3−i ◦Fi for i = 1,2. By repeated applications of these relations,
we obtain
(µ1,x,µ2,x) = F
(m2)
2 ◦H
(m)
1 ◦F
(m1)
1 ◦F
(m3)
3 (µ1,0,µ2,0), (D.7)
where H1 = F1 ◦F2, m1 ∈ {0,1}, m2 ∈ {0,1} and m1 +m2 +m3 +
m=Nx. Note that Nx is the number of effective updates that can po-
tentially change the prices. Without loss of generality, we assume
that Nx = x, which amounts to discarding those updates that cannot
change the price of either agent.
• Case I: m1 = m2 = m = 0
In this case, both agents always synchronize their updates and
(µ1,x,µ2,x) = F
(x)
3 (µ1,0,µ2,0)
=
{
(g
( x2 )
1 (µ1,0),g
( x2 )
2 (µ2,0)), for x even,
(g
( x−12 )
1 ◦ f1(µ2,0),g
( x−12 )
2 ◦ f2(µ1,0)), for x odd,
where g1 = f1 ◦ f2 and g2 = f2 ◦ f1. Note that g1(µ∗1 ) = µ∗1 ,
and, for any z,
g1(z)−µ∗1 = g1(z)−g1(µ∗1 )= a1[ f2(z)− f2(µ∗1 )]= a1a2(z−µ∗1 ).
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Thus for any z,
|g(k)1 (z)−µ∗1 |= (a1a2)k|z−µ∗1 | → 0, as k→ ∞.
Similarly, for any z,
|g(k)2 (z)−µ∗2 |= (a1a2)k|z−µ∗2 | → 0, as k→ ∞. (D.8)
It follows that
lim
x→∞(µ1,x,µ2,x) = (µ
∗
1 ,µ
∗
2 ).
• Case II: m1 +m2 +m > 0
In this case, the agents do not always synchronize their up-
dates and m→ ∞ in (D.7). By symmetry, we assume m1 = 1;
the other case can be dealt with similarly. Note that
H(m)1 ◦F1(µ1,µ2) = ( f1 ◦g
(b m2 c)
2 (µ2),g
(d m2 e)
2 (µ2)).
Let (µ1,µ2) = F
(m3)
3 (µ1,0,µ2,0). By (D.8),
lim
m→∞H
(m)
1 ◦F1(µ1,µ2) = ( f1(µ∗2 ),µ∗2 ) = (µ∗1 ,µ∗2 ).
It follows that
lim
x→∞(µ1,n,µ2,n) = limm→∞F
(m2)
2 ◦H
(m)
1 ◦F1(µ1,µ2)
= F(m2)2 (µ
∗
1 ,µ
∗
2 ) = (µ
∗
1 ,µ
∗
2 ),
where in the last step we have used the fact that (µ∗1 ,µ
∗
2 ) is a
fixed point of F(m2)2 for m2 = 0,1.
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